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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the investigation of environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) disclosure regulation process and its possible connection with countries’ com-
petitiveness as an integral part of countries’ Corporate Social and Environmental 
Responsibility (CSER) poliсy. ESG disclosure regulation criteria were examined 
according to their classification on Pension Fund Regulation, Stewardship Code, 
Government Corporate ESG disclosure, and Non-Government Corporate ESG dis-
closure by UNPRI in 2016 and for developed countries and developing and emerging 
countries separately. In order to find the relationship between ESG disclosure and the 
countries’ competitiveness (describing by Global Competitiveness Index), variety of 
statistical tests was applied (Student’s t-tests, ANOVA analysis, Mann-Whitney tests, 
simple average analysis and regression analysis with dummy variables). Research hy-
potheses about statistically significant differences in ESG disclosure regulation between 
developed countries and developing and emerging countries and the influence of ESG 
disclosure regulation on the overall competitiveness of the country were proved. ESG 
disclosure regulation became an effective instrument of countries CSER policy and 
tools for increasing their competitiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
The public policy in the area of corporate social and environmen-
tal responsibility (CSER) and its disclosure are the microeconomic 
level of the sustainable development paradigm, the basis for pro-
moting “green” initiatives and ways to achieve the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for companies in various 
sectors of the economy. The introduction of CSER policy (strate-
gy) is an important tool for enhancing both the transparency and 
competitiveness of companies and the competitiveness of the coun-
tries. At the same time, the regulatory framework for the disclosure 
of information by companies is not only financial and economic, 
but also environmental (E), social (S) and governance (G) crite-
ria, which are a core of the CSER policy. More than 300 regula-
tory disclosure tools according to ESG criteria (codes (including 
Stewardship codes), standards, laws, principles, regulation (includ-
ing Pension Fund regulation) and conceptual frameworks) have 
been developed by the time of the 50 largest countries by the level 
of economic development. Most of them have been adopted in re-
cent years (UNPRI, 2016b).
Government standardization and ESG disclosure regulation, im-
plementation of sustainable development reporting, integrated re-
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porting or other forms of non-financial reporting can be seen as one of the tools for increasing 
transparency, investment attractiveness and competitiveness of companies, and hence the coun-
tries competitiveness.
Strengthening the countries competitive position around the world through national CSER policy is at 
the heart of the new concept for calculating the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic 
Forum in 2018 (GCI 4.0 WEF, 2018).
The study of the experience of the ten most competitive countries from 140 countries in the GCI 4.0 in-
dex (in the order of descending value of the index), namely USA, Singapore, Germany, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, SAR Hong Kong, United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, testifies to the rather developed 
system of information disclosure regulation by companies according to the ESG criteria in these coun-
tries, which is integrated into the national CSER policy.
For Ukraine whose position in the Global Competitiveness Index is not high (83rd out of 140 countries 
in 2018 (WEF, 2018), the implementation of the CSER policy and ESG disclosure in the public, finan-
cial and real sectors of the economy in view of the best world experience can become a new vector in 
restructuring the economic system on the basis of business responsibility, transparency and investment 
attractiveness, minimizing information asymmetry and enhancing the effectiveness of financial mar-
kets, social partnership and trust of stakeholders.
Thus, the proof and formalization of the relationship between the introduction of ESG disclosure regu-
lation and the countries competitiveness is an important scientific and applied task.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research of the relationship between the intro-
duction of ESG disclosure and the countries 
competitiveness in academic studies has differ-
ent levels (companies, industries, country or 
country union (area)). 
The study of Peiró-Signes and Segarra-Oña (2013) 
was characterized by high level of aggregation. 
They comprehensively describe implementation 
of ESG criteria across countries, continents, and 
industries. In turn, Iamandi et al. (2019) analyze 
ESG criteria implementation on the area level 
data from the EU, including country, thematic 
and sectoral perspectives, and named ESG ap-
proach in the EU as “aimed to increase the cor-
porate competitiveness and to support the so-
cietal well-being altogether”. The EU countries 
were also an object in investigation made by 
Sassen, Hinze, and Hardeck (2016), special at-
tention was given to Sweden, Finland, Denmark 
and Norway in Dahlberg and Wiklund (2018). 
The case of Australia was researched in Sila and 
Cek (2017), Malaysia and Singapore – in Tarmuji 
et al. (2016).
Therefore, the vast majority of relevant literature 
concentrated on the relationship between com-
panies’ competitiveness (in different types and 
forms) and its transparency and ESG criteria in-
corporation. Academic sources suggest that in-
clusion of non-financial indicators, structured ac-
cording to ESG criteria in the company reporting, 
can increase its transparency and competitiveness, 
in particular, by reducing the information asym-
metry between the company and the stakeholders. 
For example, the increase in transparency of CSER 
reporting led to an increase in the share price of 
the companies by sector in the first year by 7.1%, in 
the second year by 8.4% (Healy, 1999).
In other studies, there is a confirmation of an 
increase in the shares price of reporting com-
panies on average by 4.4% per annum in their 
liquidity, and the value of the Tobin coefficient 
(Ernst & Young, 2013), facilitating access to 
funding (a decrease in the Kaplan-Zingales in-
dex by 0.6 for more transparent companies, rise 
in loyalty, motivation, innovative activity of em-
ployees, improvement of the business process-
es, quality management of resources and risks, 
waste and decision-making processes (Ernst & 
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Young; GreenBiz Group, 2013). In this case, the 
advantages of ESG disclosure are transformed 
into competitive advantages for companies.
On the whole, it should be noted that there is 
a certain parity between supporters and oppo-
nents of the relationship between additional dis-
closure of information (Mynhardt et al., 2017a, 
pp. 96-97), Mynhardt et al. (2017b, p. 8) and the 
competitiveness of companies, which in this 
research means the financial performance im-
provement. Supporters of ESG disclosure pos-
itive influence on financial performance such 
as Eccles et al. (2012), Khavech et al. (2012), 
Ngwakwe (2009), Schadewitz and Niskala (2010), 
Bayoud et al. (2012), Reddy and Gordon (2010), 
Ekwueme et al. (2013) indicate a strong relation-
ship between ESG disclosure and increase in 
companies’ accounting efficiency, price of shares, 
market share and capitalization, reduction of in-
formation asymmetry. 
Opponents of ESG disclosure positive influence 
on financial performance such as Cormier and 
Magnan (2007), Detre and Gunderson (2011), 
Lewis (2016) and neutral relationship witnesses 
such as McWilliams and Siegel (2000), Adams 
et al. (2012), Buys et al. (2011), Humphrey et al. 
(2012), Najah and Jarboui (2013), Qiua (2016) state 
that companies’ additional ESG disclosure has 
negative impact on share prices, financial efficien-
cy, greenwashing practices or has no statistically 
significant effect.
Besides finding the relationship between ESG dis-
closure and competitiveness, the results of complex 
studies by Ioannou and Serafeim (2011), Wensen 
et al. (2011) indicate the impact of standardiza-
tion on the quality of corporate disclosures. In our 
study, standardization refers to the form of regu-
lation and control tool, which allows for increased 
coordination and compliance in the standardized 
field (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000). ESG disclo-
sure and sustainability reporting assurance initi-
atives, both governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations and exchanges, have also significant 
impetus to this type of disclosure standardization 
(Sukhonos & Makarenko, 2017, pp. 168-169). 
In addition to academic sources, the work of su-
pranational organizations such as the OECD and 
UNPRI indicates the benefits of the ESG disclo-
sure at the global level. Thus, the global harmo-
nization of efforts by regulators to show progress 
towards the target 12.6 SDG indicates the need 
to standardize ESG disclosure. The opinion ex-
pressed in the OECD study (OECD, 2014) is rel-
evant: reporting on ESG criteria that emerged as 
a voluntary practice in response to the needs of 
stakeholders, exchanges, investors, and interna-
tional organizations following the Sustainable 
Development Summits (in particular, the Rio + 20 
Summit 2012) is gradually becoming mandatory 
for listed companies in certain countries of the 
world. However, it should be mandatory for all 
companies to draw the attention of government 
agencies in order to streamline the scope, struc-
ture, key characteristics of the heterogeneous na-
ture and scope of reporting and its role in ensur-
ing the countries’ competitiveness and financial 
performance of the OECD (2014, p. 26). 
The study of the 50 largest countries in the world 
GDP (UNPRI, 2016b) gives an evidence that 
among the tools for promoting responsible invest-
ment, the requirements for corporate ESG disclo-
sure were implemented in 76% of the countries 
under study. Among them, government require-
ments exist in 38 countries, the requirements of 
stock exchanges and non-governmental organiza-
tions in 26 and 23 countries, respectively. Pension 
Fund Regulation and disclosure requirements, as 
well as SCs, are implemented in 46% and 28% of 
the countries, respectively.
Dominant drivers for the ESG disclosure promo-
tion are regulatory requirements in the most com-
petitive countries in the world, which stipulate al-
most 100% mandatory disclosure of non-financial 
information (Table 1).
In Ukraine, only 21.7% of companies reveal the in-
formation on CSER (based on the results of the 
CSR Development Center’s Transparency Index in 
Ukraine 2017), which indicates that Ukrainian com-
panies do not perceive CSER as a policy that inte-
grates into business strategy and is the basis of the 
company’s competitiveness on the market. At the 
same time, due to the implementation of CSR meas-
ures, Ukrainian companies will be able to contribute 
to increasing their competitiveness on the global, re-
gional and domestic markets (Zinchenko et al., 2018).
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2. DATA AND  
METHODOLOGY
We use country data concerning ESG disclosure 
(Government Corporate ESG disclosure (GCESG) 
and Non-Government Corporate ESG disclo-
sure (NGCESG), Pension Fund Regulation (PFR) 
and Stewardship Code (SC) implementing from 
responsible investment regulation map, sum-
marized by UNPRI (2016b) and UNPRI (2016c). 
The largest economy (developed and developing) 
was chosen in accordance with MSCI ACWI in-
dex (MSCI, 2016. Another important data source 
is WEF (2017). Initial data set is presented in 
Appendix A (Table A1).
The following hypotheses are tested in this 
research:
H1: There are differences in ESG disclosure regu-
lation between developed countries and de-
veloping and emerging countries. 
H2: ESG disclosure regulation influences overall 
competitiveness of the countries.
To confirm/reject these hypotheses, we use a num-
ber of parametrical and non-parametrical tests in-
cluding Student’s t-tests, ANOVA analysis, Mann-
Whitney tests, as well as simple average analysis 
and special technics like regression analysis with 
dummy variables.
To do this, overall, data set is divided into 2 
groups: developed countries’ data and developing 
and emerging countries.
Average analysis provides preliminary evidence 
on whether there are differences between devel-
oped and emerging countries’ data. 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests are 
carried out given the evidence of statistically sig-
nificant differences in data sets. The null hypothe-
sis (H0) in each case is that the data belong to the 
same population, a rejection of the null suggesting 
the presence of statistically significant difference 
between analyzed data sets. 
The tests are carried out at the 95% confidence lev-
el, and the degrees of freedom are 1N −  (N  be-
ing equal to )1 2 .N N+
We also run multiple regressions including a dum-
my variable to identify possible differences be-
tween developed and emerging countries:
Table 1. Countries with the highest share of ESG disclosure in annual company reports and regulatory 
requirements for its compilation
Source: WEF (2017), WEF (2018), UNPRI (2016a), UNPRI (2016b), UNPRI (2016c), MSCI (2016).
Country GCI 4.0, points
ESG disclosure 
quote, %
Status
The USA 85.6 94 Mandatory and voluntary ESG
Singapore 83.5 84 Mandatory and voluntary ESG
Germany 82.8 73
Mandatory environmental criteria, mandatory ESG criteria in 
progress, mandatory social criteria in progress, comply and 
explain governmental criteria
Switzerland 82.6 82
Mandatory environmental criteria, mandatory ESG in progress, 
comply and explain governmental criteria, Mandatory social 
criteria in progress
Japan 82.5 99 Mandatory and voluntary environmental criteria
The Netherlands 82.4 82
Mandatory environmental criteria, mandatory ESG, mandatory 
social criteria in progress
Hong Kong 82.3 n/a n/a
United Kingdom 82.0 99
Mandatory environmental criteria, mandatory ESG, comply 
and explain governmental criteria, mandatory social criteria, 
voluntary social criteria 
Sweden 81.7 88
Mandatory environmental, mandatory ESG in progress, comply 
and explain governmental criteria, mandatory social criteria in 
progress
Denmark 80.6 94
Mandatory environmental, comply and explain ESG, mandatory 
ESG in progress, mandatory social criteria in progress
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0 1
,
i i i
Y a a D ε= + +  (1)
where 
i
Y  – ESG criterion value for developed 
country ,i  
n
a  – mean ESG criterion value for 
the developed countries, 
nt
D  – dummy variable 
for the emerging countries, equal to 1 for obser-
vations corresponding to the emerging countries 
and to 0 otherwise, 
i
ε  – error term for country .i
The size, sign and statistical significance of the 
dummy coefficients provide information about 
possible differences. 
To test Hypothesis 2, correlation analysis, Granger 
causality tests and multiply regression analysis are 
used.
3. RESULTS
First, we test Hypothesis 1: There are differences 
in ESG disclosure regulation between developed 
countries and developing and emerging coun-
tries. To do this, variety of statistical tests, includ-
ing average analysis and regression analysis, are 
performed. 
Results of average analysis are presented in 
Appendix B. As can be seen, all analyzed ESG cri-
teria (PFR, SC, GCESG and NGCESG) in devel-
oped countries were higher than in case of devel-
oping and emerging countries.
To find whether these differences are statistical-
ly significant or not, we perform parametric tests 
(Student’s t-test and ANOVA), non-parametric 
tests (Mann-Whitney tests), as well as regression 
analysis with dummy variables. Results are pre-
sented in Appendix C. In order to ease their inter-
pretation, we summarize these results in Table 2. 
Overall picture is very clear: there are statistically 
significant differences in ESG disclosure regula-
tion between developed countries and developing 
and emerging countries. Developed countries pay 
much more attention to this aspect. So, Hypothesis 
1 is confirmed.
Next, we test Hypothesis 2: ESG disclosure regu-
lation influences overall competitiveness of the 
country.
To do this, as a preliminary empirical evidence, 
we provide correlation analysis between ESG cri-
teria (PFR, SC, GCESG and NGCESG) and overall 
competitiveness of the country (see Appendix D 
for results). In case of developed countries, all ESG 
criteria are negatively correlated with the rank (the 
lower the rank, the better the results). It means 
that the use of ESG regulation is one of the signs of 
a good economy. As for the case of developing and 
emerging countries, the results are mixed: most of 
the criteria (GCESG and NGCESG) show positive 
correlation. This can be explained by very low lev-
el of involvement into ESG regulation.
An obvious conclusion from these results is that 
ESG regulation is an important part of competi-
tiveness of the countries.
To find additional evidences in this favour, we 
perform Granger causality tests (see Appendix 
E). Overall, there are no statistically significant 
and confirmed causalities between ESG crite-
ria and rank of the country in the ranking of 
50 largest economies. Still, in most of the cases, 
rank was rather dependent variable than inde-
pendent, which is one more indirect evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis 2: the more ESG criteria ac-
tually used by the country, the more competitive 
the country.
Table 2. Overview of the results for ESG criteria
Type of regulation/
methodology
Average 
analysis
Student’s t-test ANOVA Mann-Whitney test
Regression analysis 
with dummies
PFR + + + + +
SC + – – – –
GCESG – – – + –
NGCESG – – – + –
Note: “+” indicates the presence of statistically significant difference between developed countries and developing and 
emerging countries’ data sets, “–” indicates the absence of statistically significant difference between developed countries 
and developing and emerging countries’ data sets.
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On the final stage of Hypothesis 2 testing, we 
run a multiplied regression analysis (rank as 
dependent variable and ESG criteria as inde-
pendent variables). Results are presented in 
Table 3.
As can be seen in case of overall data set, there is 
rather strict dependence between ESG disclosure 
regulation and overall competitiveness of the 
countries. Negative signs of coefficients in regres-
sion equation (see Eq. 1) show that the more ESG 
criteria used for disclosure regulation, the higher 
the competitiveness of the country:
1 2
3 4
31.00 0.5461 3.4545
0.6939 0.5958 ,
i
Y a a
a a
= − ⋅ − ⋅ −
− ⋅ − ⋅  (2)
where 
i
Y  – is rank of the country in the ranking 
in 50 largest economies, 
1
a  – PFR, 
2
a  – SC, 
3
a  – 
GCESG, 
4
a  NGCESG.
As can be seen from this regression model, SC has 
higgest influence on the competitiveness of the coun-
try. All other groups (PFR, GCESG and NGCESG) 
in general have equal impact, which is 6-7 times low-
er than the SC criteria. So, the SC looks like a prima-
ry object, the first one to start if the country decides 
to incorporate ESG disclosure regulation.
Overall, we find some evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 2. ESG disclosure regulation really in-
fluences overall competitiveness of the countries. 
This influence is direct: the more ESG disclosure 
criteria executed by the country, the higher its 
competitiveness of the country. 
Table 3. Multiplied regression analysis: ranking in 50 largest economies (Y) and ESG disclosure 
regulation variables (X variables)
Parameter Overall data set Case of developed countries
Case of developing and 
emerging countries
0
a  31.00 (0.00) 40.98 (0.00) 22.07 (0.00)
PFR, 1a –0.5461 (0.82) 3.0699 (0.56) 1.1325 (0.73)
SC, 2a –3.4545 (0.17) –0.8185 (0.81) –4.3067 (0.32)
GCESG, 3a –0.6939 (0.61) –3.4498 (0.22) 1.2592 (0.51)
NGCESG, 4a –0.5958 (0.75) –4.3396 (0.16) 2.6801 (0.31)
F-test 0.91 1.08 0.64
Multiple R 0.27 0.45 0.32
CONCLUSION
This paper examines ESG disclosure regulation criteria focusing on PFR, SC, GCESG and NGCESG 
criteria. We split overall data set into 2 groups: developed countries and developing and emerging 
countries. Applying the variety of statistical tests including Student’s t-tests, ANOVA analysis, Mann-
Whitney tests, as well as simple average analysis and special technics like regression analysis with dum-
my variables, the following hypotheses are tested: Hypothesis 1 – there are differences in ESG disclosure 
regulation between developed countries and developing and emerging countries; Hypothesis 2 – ESG 
disclosure regulation influences overall competitiveness of the countries.
Overall conclusions are as follows. There are statistically significant differences in ESG disclosure reg-
ulation between developed countries and developing and emerging countries. Developed countries pay 
much more attention to this aspect. So, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.
Some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 is found as well. ESG disclosure regulation really influences 
overall competitiveness of the countries. This influence is direct: the more ESG disclosure criteria exe-
cuted by the country, the higher the competitiveness of the countries. 
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Results of this paper clearly show that ESG disclosure regulation is an important part of the modern 
economic system. This is one of the evolutionary stages: to move further in development, the countries 
need to incorporate ESG disclosure regulation in their systems. According to results of this paper, the 
highest effect for the competitiveness can be provided by incorporating SC criteria.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Initial data set
Rank PFR SC GCESG NGCESG
DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC DC DEC
12 21 2 0 2 0 4 2 4 0
29 47 2 0 0 0 4 2 3 2
25 9 2 0 2 2 4 2 2 3
10 42 3 0 0 0 7 5 3 2
37 2 2 0 2 0 5 5 2 2
44 39 2 2 0 0 6 2 2 2
6 32 2 0 0 0 4 2 2 2
4 46 2 2 2 0 6 4 2 0
34 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 0
43 16 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 2
36 26 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
8 50 2 0 2 0 5 2 2 3
3 35 0 0 2 2 2 5 2 0
17 15 3 2 0 0 4 2 2 2
28 23 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 3
45 41 2 0 0 0 3 2 0 2
38 49 0 0 2 0 2 4 3 2
14 40 2 0 0 0 6 2 2 2
22 24 2 2 0 0 6 3 2 2
19 13 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0
5 20 2 0 2 0 7 2 2 0
1 33 0 3 0 2 2 3 3 2
– 11 – 2 – 2 – 2 – 0
– 27 – 0 – 0 – 3 – 2
– 18 – 0 – 0 – 4 – 2
– 31 – 0 – 0 – 2 – 0
– 30 – 0 – 0 – 0 – 2
– 48 – 0 – 0 – 2 – 2
Note: DC is used for developed countries, DEC is used for developing and emerging countries.
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APPENDIX B
Average analysis
Figure B3. GCESG
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Figure B2. SC
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APPENDIX C
Parametric tests: Student’s t-test
Table C1. T-test of the differences between developed countries and developing and emerging 
countries
Parameter RFR SC GCESG NGCESG
t-criterion 3.31 2.00 2.63 2.08
t critical (p = 0.95) 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Parametric tests: ANOVA
Table C2. ANOVA test of the differences between developed countries and developing and emerging 
countries
Parameter RFR SC GCESG NGCESG
F 12.49 4.79 8.41 5.05
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
F critical 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Non-parametric tests: Mann-Whitney tests
Table C3. Mann-Whitney tests of the differences between developed countries and developing  
and emerging countries
Parameter RFR SC GCESG NGCESG
Adjusted H 10.23 4.45 7.27 4.55
d.f. 1 1 1 1
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Regression analysis with dummy variables
Table C4. Regression analysis with dummy variables of the differences between developed countries 
and developing and emerging countries*
Parameter RFR SC GCESG NGCESG
0
a 1.4545 (0.00) 0.8182 (0.00) 3.9091 (0.00) 2.1818 (0.00)
1
a –0.9903 (0.00) –0.5325 (0.03) –1.4448 (0.00) –0.7175 (0.03)
F test 12.49 4.79 8.41 5.05
Multiple R 0.45 0.30 0.00 0.03
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Note: * p-values are in parentheses.
87
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 17, Issue 3, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.17(3).2019.06
APPENDIX D
Correlation analysis
Table D1. Correlation analysis of ESG disclosure regulation and overall competitiveness of the 
countries: case of all data set
Parameter Ranking in 50 largest economies PFR SC GCESG NGCESG
Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 –0.14 –0.24 –0.15 –0.10
PFR –0.14 1 0.22 0.56 0.05
SC –0.24 0.22 1 0.16 0.23
GCESG –0.15 0.56 0.16 1 0.01
NGCESG –0.10 0.05 0.23 0.01 1
Table D2. Correlation analysis of ESG disclosure regulation and overall competitiveness of the 
countries: case of developed countries
Parameter Ranking in 50 largest economies PFR SC GCESG NGCESG
Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 –0.09 –0.19 –0.22 –0.31
PFR –0.09 1 –0.10 0.80 –0.18
SC –0.19 –0.10 1 –0.01 0.35
GCESG –0.22 0.80 –0.01 1 –0.21
NGCESG –0.31 –0.18 0.35 –0.21 1
Table D3. Correlation analysis of ESG disclosure regulation and overall competitiveness of the 
countries: case of developing and emerging countries
Parameter Ranking in 50 largest economies PFR SC GCESG NGCESG
Ranking in 50 largest economies 1 0.00 –0.19 0.10 0.22
PFR 0.00 1 0.35 0.08 –0.04
SC –0.19 0.35 1 0.15 –0.08
GCESG 0.10 0.08 0.15 1 –0.02
NGCESG 0.22 –0.04 –0.08 –0.02 1
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APPENDIX E
Granger causality tests
Table E1. Granger causality test: rank (X) and PFR (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Granger causality test: Y = f(X)
47 –1 0.04 0.84
Granger causality test: X = f(Y)
47 –1 0.64 0.42
Table E2. Granger causality test: rank (X) and SC (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Granger causality test: Y = f(X)
47 –1 3.427 0.071
Granger causality test: X = f(Y)
47 –1 2.413 0.127
Table E3. Granger causality test: rank (X) and GCESG (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Granger causality test: Y = f(X)
47 –1 0.356 0.553
Granger causality test: X = f(Y)
47 –1 0.842 0.364
Table E4. Granger causality test: rank (X) and NGCESG (Y)
Res. DF Diff. DF F p-value
Granger causality test: Y = f(X)
47 –1 0.72 0.401
Granger causality test: X = f(Y)
47 –1 0.831 0.367
